INSURANCE-INvALIDITY OF "OTHER INSURANCE" CLAUSES IN A DouBLE COVERAGE SITUATIoN-McFarland v. Motor Club of America In-

surance Co., 120 N.J. Super. 554, 295 A.2d 375 (Ch. 1972).
Plaintiff Vander McFarland, a passenger in a vehicle owned and
operated by Andrew McFarland, sustained injuries resulting in special
damages of $2,530 as a result of an automobile collision caused by the
negligence of the uninsured owner and operator of another vehicle.'
Vander collected the $10,000 limit available to him under Andrew
McFarland's uninsured motorist clause with the Allstate Insurance
Company.
Claiming damages for expenses, personal injuries, and pain and
suffering which exceeded the $10,000 ceiling of the Allstate uninsured
motorist clause, plaintiff, Vander McFarland, sought further compensation under the uninsured motorist provision in his own policy with
defendant, Motor Club of America. Defendant denied liability for any
excess over the $10,000 provided by Allstate claiming that the "other
insurance" clause in its policy precluded recovery in multiple coverage
situations unless its own policy limits exceeded the limits of the additional policy.2 Further, the defendant contended that even where its
policy limits exceed the limits of the Allstate policy, recovery is restricted to the difference between the two policy coverages despite the
fact that the claimant's damages exceed that amount. Both the Allstate
and Motor Club of America policies had coverage limits of $10,000
which the defendant claims is the maximum required under the New
Jersey uninsured motorist statute.8 Thus, by defendant's interpretation
I McFarland v. Motor Club of America Ins. Co., 120 N.J. Super. 554, 555, 295 A.2d
375, 376 (Ch. 1972).
2 The clause in question reads:
"Other insurance: With respect to bodily injury to an insured while occupying
an automobile not owned by the name insured, the insurance under Part IV
(UM) shall apply only as excess insurance over any other similar insurance available to such insured and applicable to such automobile as primary insurance,
and this insurance shall then apply only in the amount by which the limit of
liability for this coverage exceeds the applicable limit of liability of such other
insurance .... "
Id. at 557, 295 A.2d at 377.
8 Id. at 556-57, 295 A.2d at 376-77. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:28-1.1 (1970) provides in
part:
No automobile liability policy or renewal of such policy... shall be delivered
or issued for delivery in this State with respect to any motor vehicle registered or
principally garaged in this State unless coverage is offered in connection therewith, in limits for bodily injury or death set forth in section 9 of chapter 174
of the laws of 1952 (C. 39:6-69), under provisions approved by the Commissioner
of Banking and Insurance, for payment of all or part of the sums which the

697

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 4:697

of the "other insurance" clause, plaintiff was denied recovery under
the second policy.
Both parties moved for summary judgment in the Superior Court
of New Jersey Chancery Division, and in McFarlandv. Motor Club of
America Insurance Co., 4 the court found that N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:281.1, which requires uninsured motorist clauses to be offered in any
automobile liability policy sold in New Jersey, merely sets out a minimum recoverable amount. The court held that the statute was not a
bar to recovery beyond that minimum amount but only a restriction
against dual recoveries for the same loss. Thus "[w]here an insured's
loss exceeds the limits of one policy, he may proceed against the other
available policies." 5 Where the "other insurance" clause acts to deny
recovery paid for, it is "violative of public policy and is invalid."
The New Jersey uninsured motorist problem was first dealt with
by the Unsatisfied Claim and Judgment Fund Law7 which provided protection to New Jersey residents who sustained bodily injury or property damage due to the negligence of an uninsured motorist. The legislative scheme created a fund against which innocent victims could
claim for financial recovery. The Fund was unsuccessful economically
due to its financial life-source.8 The method of funding involved assessments on uninsured motorists, basically a disadvantaged group, uninsured or his legal representative shall be legally entitled to recover as damages
from the operator or owner of an uninsured automobile ....
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:28-1.2 (1970) allows rejection of the offer:
The named insured shall elect to accept or reject the offer of coverage
required pursuant to section 2 of this act. Such election shall be in writing and
upon receipt thereof by the insurer such coverage shall or shall not be provided in the policy according to said election.
4 120 N.J. Super. 554, 295 A.2d 375 (Ch. 1972).
5 Id. at 563, 295 A.2d at 380.
6 Id.

7 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:6-61 (1961). The Fund was created by assessments made on
anyone registering a vehicle in the state both insured and uninsured and on the net
direct written premiums of any company selling automobile liability insurance in the
state. Such assessments were set by the Director of Motor Vehicles.
8 See N.J. DIVIsIoN OF MOTOR VEHICLES MANAGER'S ANNUAL REPORT TO THE UNSATISFIED

CLAIM AND JUDGMENT FUND BOARD 5-12 (1971) which indicates that the Fund was in some
financial difficulty even when N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 17:28-1.1, 1.2 were enacted. Although the
Fund seems adequate as per the following:
Income:
Funds Paid Out
& Expenses:

$9,351,619.89

6,326,436.56
Excess:
$3,025,183.33
reserves in the Fund have been less in the latest high payment years than they were
in the early low payment years.

1973]

NO TES

derstandably incapable of supporting the financial responsibility of
compensating the innocent victims.9 In an attempt to remedy the problem, the legislature shifted the burden to the insured motorists themselves by allowing that class to purchase protection against the uninsured. 10 The amount of coverage set forth in the resulting statute is
$10,000 for injury to or death of one person in any one accident, $20,000 for injury to or death of more than one person in any one accident,
and $5,000 for damage to property in any one accident, such limits
being identical to those contained in the Unsatisfied Claim and Judgment Fund Law."
Pursuant to this legislative mandate a single form of coverage
against uninsured motorists was to be used by insurers in New Jersey,
generally paralleling endorsements used in other states.' 2 The endorsements provide protection through the insurance company's agreement
to pay all sums within the policy limits which the insured or his representative is legally entitled to recover from the uninsured motorist.1 8
This type of endorsement was introduced in 1955 by the insurance
industry to counteract the various enactments and proposals for compensation on behalf of the insured 4 i.e., compulsory insurance laws, 15
unsatisfied judgment funds, 16 and compensation without fault.17 As a
Jersey, 3 SETON HALL
19, 20 (1971) wherein the author noted:
Uninsured motorists are a relatively small class of persons, but they include
within their ranks . . . a disproportionately high number of economically poor
persons and a disproportionately high number of socially inadequate persons.
10 Prior to this enactment uninsured motorist coverage was available only for outof-state accidents. Law of April 19, 1961, ch. 11, § 1, [1961] N.J. Laws 34, as amended N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 17:28-1 (1970).
11 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:6-69 (1961).
12 See Stanton, supra note 9, at 54-60.
13 The National Bureau of Casualty Underwriters (the association of stock companies) and the Mutual Insurance Rating Bureau (the association of mutual companies)
jointly create standard provisions for liability insurance coverage. National Bureau of
Casualty Underwriters, Uninsured Motorist Endorsement, No. UM 1-4, May 1, 1966. See
Widiss, Perspectives on Uninsured Motorist Coverage, 62 Nw. U.L. REV. 497, 500-01
(1967).
14 See Widiss, supra note 13, at 498-99.
15 See McVay, The Case Against Compulsory Automobile Insurance, 15 OHIO S.L.J.
150 (1954); Marx, A Reply to "The Case Against Compulsory Automobile Compensation
Insurance," 15 OHIo S.L.J. 157 (1954); Comment, The Financially Irresponsible Motorist:
A Survey of State Legislation, 10 VILL. L. REV. 545, 546-47 (1965). See also R. KEETON & J.
O'CONNELL, BASIC PROTECTION FOR THE TRAFFIC VICrIM 76-102 (1965).
16 Several states had enacted legislation forming unsatisfied judgment funds in the
1950's: e.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 662, §§ 150-179 (Repl. 1967); MICH. COMP. LAWS §§
257.1101 et seq. (1965); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 39:6-61 to -91 (1961); N.Y. INS. LAW §§ 600-26
(McKinney 1966).
17 The Saskatchewan plan of compensation without fault had been in existence prior
9 See Stanton, Protection Against Uninsured Motorists in New
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result, a majority of the states have adopted the uninsured motorist
18
protection approach.
Due to the widespread use of such protection, the probability of
being covered by multiple policies increased. The insurance industry
responded by inserting "other insurance" clauses19 drafted to restrict
multiple recovery and consequently reduced the potential liability of
the insurer.2 0 McFarland illustrates precisely this situation. The defendant insurer effectively reduces its own exposure to liability in any
situation where other insurance is available (Allstate's primary coverage) to "the amount by which the limit of liability for this coverage
exceeds the applicable limit of liability of such other insurance."121 The
insurance industry in practice provides coverage as per the minimum
limits of financial responsibility laws of each state. Therefore where
two policies cover the same loss the limits are usually identical, thereby
22
negating the paid-for protection of the "other insurance" policy.

"Other insurance" clauses are primarily directed at the problem
of double insurance or concurrent coverage problems, which occur
when two or more insurers cover the same person for a loss resulting
from the same risk.23 These clauses were first used in the property insurance field to guard against over-insurance particularly where the
to mid-1950's. See Lang, The Nature and Potential of the Saskatchewan Insurance Experiment, 14 U. FLA. L. REv. 352 (1962).
18 See Ghiardi & Wienke, Recent Developments in the Cancellation, Renewal and
Rescission of Automobile Insurance Policies, 51 MARQ. L. REv. 219, 244 n.147 (1967-68).
19 In support of this proposition one author has noted that:
When an insured is injured while occupying a highway vehicle not owned
by the named insured, the standard endorsement provides that the insured's
policy applies only as excess coverage over any other similar insurance available
to such an insured and applicable as primary insurance.
Widiss, supra note 13, at 522 (footnote omitted).
20 Id.

21 120 N.J. Super. at 557, 295 A.2d at 377. Defendant contended:
"[T]he UM [uninsured motorist] insurance which applies to the vehicle claimant
is occupying is viewed as primary insurance, so that the claimant's own uninsured motorist endorsement (if any) applies only in the event that its coverage
is more extensive than the primary coverage and then only for the amount of
such 'excess.'
Id.
22 Donaldson, Uninsured Motorist Coverage, 36 INs. COUNSEL J. 397, 426 (1969). The
McFarland court noted:
Under this construction, Motor Club need only adopt the $10,000 and $20,000
minimums of N.J.S.A. 17:28-1.1 as its maximum coverage offered, in order
to escape liability to its insured guest whenever the host-driver has similar
coverage. In no instance will the Motor Club coverage be "more extensive" than
the "primary coverage."
120 N.J. Super. at 557, 295 A.2d at 377. See also Stanton, supra note 9, at 49.
28 See generally Russ, The Double Insurance Problem-A Proposal, 13 HASTINGS
L.J. 183 (1961); Comment, Conflicts Between "Other Insurance" Clauses in Automobile
Liability Policies, 20 HASTINGS L.J. 1292 (1969).
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injury to be compensated was fraudulently inflicted on the insured's
property. Since this defrauding scheme is relatively rare in the automobile insurance area, the purpose of these clauses is merely an effort
24
to reduce the insurer's liability.
The categorization of "other insurance" clauses is delimited by the
extent of liability to which the insurer is exposed. The first type is the
"escape" clause which denies all liability in a double coverage situation. 25 Thus the escape clause provides a windfall for the insurer since
it collects premiums while incurring no liability. The "excess" clause
limits the insurer's liability to the amount of loss sustained beyond the
policy limits of the other insurer. 26 A variation of the "pure" excess is
the "limited" excess clause which allows the insurer to confine its liability to the difference between its own policy ceiling and the total
amount of all other available coverage.27 This type has also been
referred to as a "modified escape" 28 clause since the operative effect of
such a clause, where the amount of all other insurance coverage equals
or exceeds the limits of the particular policy, relieves the "limited" excess insurer of all liability. 29 The last principal type of "other insurance"
clauses is the pro rata 0 form which provides that a proportionate share
of the loss will be paid by the insurer according to some court-estab24 See Russ, supra note 23; Comment, "Other Insurance" Clauses: The Lamb-Weston
Doctrine, 47 ORE. L. R~v. 430 (1968).
25 E.g., Zurich Gen. Accident &cLiab. Ins. Co. v. Clamor, 124 F.2d 717 (7th Cir.
1942):
The insurance [policy] was not applicable to "any person . . . with respect to
any loss against which he has other valid and collectible insurance."
Id. at 718.
26 E.g., Cosmopolitan Mut. Ins. Co. v. Continental Cas. Co., 28 N.J. 554, 147 A.2d
529 (1958):
If the insured has other insurance against a loss covered by this policy
the Company shall not be liable under this policy for a greater proportion of
such loss than the applicable limit of liability stated in the declarations bears to
the total applicable limit of liability of all valid and collectible insurance against
such loss; provided, however, the insurance under this policy . . . shall be excess
insurance over any other valid and collectible insurance.
Id. at 556-57, 147 A.2d at 530.
27 E.g., Vignali v. Farmers Equitable Ins. Co., 71 Ill. App. 2d 114, 216 N.E.2d
827 (1966):
[T]he insurance hereunder shall apply only as excess insurance over any similar
insurance available to such occupant, and this insurance shall then apply only
in the amount by which the applicable limit of liability of this endorsement
exceeds the sum of the applicable limits of liability of all such other insurance.
Id. at 119, 216 N.E.2d 830.
28 See Russ, supra note 23, at 184.
29 See Comment, supra note 23, at 1295.
80 E.g., Woodrich Constr. Co. v. Indemnity Ins. Co. of N. America, 252 Minn. 86,
189 N.W.2d 412 (1958):
If the insured has other insurance against a loss covered by this policy
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lished formula.8 1 The clause under dispute in McFarland was the
"limited" excess type which allows the insurer to sell a nullity to the
insured since most uninsured motorist policies are issued with limits
identical to the provisions of the state financial responsibility laws,
2
thus the possibility of any excess is essentially eliminated.3
Some courts have attempted to balance the injustices created by
the insurer's use of such clauses with the threat of double recovery on
the part of the insured by determining primary and secondary liability.83 Labeling an insurer primarily or secondarily liable has been accomplished in a number of ways, all of which circumvented the
84
necessity of interpreting the "other insurance" clauses themselves.
One method was a court determination of which policy in a concurrent
coverage situation was specific to the loss involved as compared to another policy which was general in nature. 85 Once determined, the
specific insurer was found to be primarily liable and the general insurer
responsible only for the portion remaining, thus becoming an excess
insurer.86
An alternate approach evolved from the property field in which
the policy with the earliest effective date was deemed to be primarily
liable. 87 Courts considering cases involving automobiles adopted this
interpretation and gave effect to any subsequent insurer's "other insurance" clause under the theory that at the time the first policy was
written, no other insurance existed to activate its policy's "other insurance" clause. This approach was effective in leaving the later policies'
"other insurance" clauses operative. 8s The third solution was to hold
the company shall not be liable under this policy for a greater proportion of
such loss than the applicable limit of liability stated in the Declarations bears to
the total applicable limit of liability of all valid and collectible insurance against
such loss.
Id. at 100, 89 N.W.2d 422.
81 See Comment, Concurrent Coverage in Automobile Liability Insurance, 65 COLUM.
L. REv. 319, 330-31 (1965).
32 See Comment, The Meaning, Scope and Validity of the Other Insurance Provisions
Which Apply to the Uninsured Motorist Endorsement, 53 MARQ. L. REv. 397, 398-99
(1970).
33 See Note, Automobile Liability Insurance-Effect of Double Coverage and "Other
Insurance" Clauses, 38 MINN. L. REv. 838, 841-55 (1954).
84 Id. For methods of handling double coverage, see also Russ, supra note 23, at 184-85;
Comment, supra note 31, at 321-22.
35 See generally Comment, supra note 23, at 1297-98; Note, supra note 33, at 841-43.
86 See, e.g., Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection & Ins. Co. v. Cochran Oil Mill &
Ginnery Co., 26 Ga. App. 288, 105 S.E. 856 (1921); Trinity Universal Ins. Co. v. General
Accident, Fire & Life Assur. Corp., 138 Ohio St. 488, 35 N.E.2d 836 (1941).
87 Russ, supra note 23, at 184; Snow, Other Insurance Clauses-Multiple Coverage,
40 DENVER L. CENTER J. 259, 265 (1963).
38 See Funke v. Minnesota Farmers' Mut. Fire Ins. Ass'n, 29 Minn. 347, 13 N.W.
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the insurer of the primary tortfeasor primarily liable89 to the full limits

of its policy, while the secondary insurer, under whose coverage the
primary tortfeasor was merely an additional insured, was held liable
40
for the excess beyond the limits of the former policy.

However the modem approach has been to treat the "other insurance" problem, when presented in the uninsured context, in either of
two ways; through an analysis of the "other insurance" clause itself, or
through an interpretation of the financial responsibility statutes' legislative purpose. 41 The majority of the courts felt that the concurrent
recovery problems could best be resolved by employing the first approach. 42 Thus, when confronted with various combinations of other
insurance clauses, these courts have developed a body of general rules
48
to resolve the inherent conflicts.
In 1952 the ninth circuit rejected the general rules approach as a
164 (1882). For automobile cases, see New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. Hartford Accident &
Indem. Co., 108 F.2d 653 (6th Cir. 1940); Michigan Alkali Co. v. Bankers Indem. Ins.
Co., 103 F.2d 345 (2d Cir. 1939).
89 Fidelity & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 124 Conn. 227, 199 A. 93 (1938).
40 Comment, supra note 31, at 322. See, e.g., American Auto. Ins. Co. v. Penn Mut.
Indem. Co., 161 F.2d 62 (3d Cir. 1947).
41 Stanton, supra note 9, at 49-50:
Those courts which have prohibited stacking have relied both on the express
language of the "other insurance" provision and upon the view that the basic
purpose of insurance against uninsured motorists is to put the claimant in as good a
position as he would have been in, had the negligent uninsured motorist had
insurance in the minimum amounts required under the financial responsibility
laws .... Courts which have allowed stacking have done so either on the basis
of manipulating the language of the "other insurance" provision, or on the
basis that where there are two endorsements, each separately paid for, there
should be recovery under both when the coverage limit of only one of them is
inadequate to pay the damages involved, or on the basis of a combination of
these two reasons.
42 In this approach three situations are possible: (1) a single "other insurance" clause,
which generally is given effect if not against public policy, (2) similar "other insurance"
clauses which are paired as follows; pro rata vs. pro rata, excess vs. excess, and escape vs. escape, (3) different "other insurance" clauses with possible pairs including; pro rata vs. excess,
pro rata vs. escape, and excess vs. escape. For a full discussion, see Comment, supra note
31, at 322-30; Comment, supra note 23, at 1299-1307; Note, supra note 33, at 847-55.
43 When similar "other insurance" clauses are paired, the general solution is that
the liability is prorated by a method deemed equitable by the court. See Cosmopolitan
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Continental Cas. Co., 28 N.J. 554, 147 A.2d 529 (1959).
The pairing of different "other insurance" clauses has been solved in a variety of
ways: (1) excess vs. pro rata-full effect is given the excess clause exposing the insurer
with the pro rata clause to primary liability, see American Auto. Ins. Co. v. Republic
Indem. Co. of America, 52 Cal. 2d 507, 341 P.2d 675 (1959); (2) escape vs. pro rata-pro
rata clause is held to be primary, see McFarland v. Chicago Express, Inc., 200 F.2d 5
(7th Cir. 1952); (3) excess vs. escape-an escape clause policy is normally found primarily
liable while an excess clause policy is thereafter responsible for any unsatisfied portion;
see Zurich Gen. Accident & Liab. Ins. Co. v. Clamor, 124 F.2d 717 (7th Cir. 1942).
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solution to conflicting "other insurance" clause situations. 44 The new
course was delineated in Oregon Automobile Insurance Co. v. United
States Fidelity & Guaranty Co.45 The court ordered a proration where
dissimilar "other insurance" clauses clashed. 46 Therefore the court
avoided a reconciliation between the excess vs. escape clauses in conflict
and prorated the loss among all the insurers concerned in proportion
to their respective policy limits. 47 Lamb-Weston, Inc. v. Oregon Automobile Insurance Co., 4s an Oregon Supreme Court decision, followed
the lead set by the court of appeals by holding:
[W]hether one policy uses one clause or another, when any come
in conflict with the "other insurance" clause of another insurer,
regardless of the nature of the clause,
they are in fact repugnant
49
and each should be rejected in toto.

Although the McFarlandcourt did not analyze the situation as one
involving conflicting "other insurance" clauses and was not required
to consider proration, the court adopted the reasoning of Lamb-Weston
-the Oregon Rule,50 and found the clause repugnant and void against
public policy. 51 The court considered the "other insurance" clause as
not constituting a concurrent coverage situation in which the same risk
and same loss were protected by several policies. 52 On the contrary, the
excess-escape clause was deemed ineffective since no other similar insurance was available regarding any amount above the $10,000 limit,
therefore
44 See Comment, supra note 24, at 435.
45 195 F.2d 958 (9th Cir. 1952). This case involved a conflict between an excess and

an escape clause which, under the existing majority rule would have mandated that the
excess clause be given effect.
46 The court reasoned:
In our opinion the "other insurance" provisions of the two policies are
indistinguishable in meaning and intent. One cannot rationally choose between
them.. . . [M~e think [they] must be held mutually repugnant and hence be
disregarded. Our conclusion is that such view affords the only rational solution
of the dispute in this case.
Id. at 960 (footnote omitted).
47 Id.
48 219 Ore. 110, 341 P.2d 110 (1959) (involving a conflict between an excess clause

and a pro rata clause). For a discussion of the case, see Comment, supra note 24.
49 219 Ore. at 129, 341 P.2d at 119. This reasoning was followed in two uninsured
motorist cases: Sparling v. Allstate Ins. Co., 249 Ore. 471, 439 P.2d 616 (1968); Smith v.
Pacific Auto. Ins. Co., 240 Ore. 167, 400 P.2d 512 (1965).
50 The McFarlandcourt rejected the reasoning of Morelock v. Millers' Mut. Ins. Ass'n,
49 Ill. 2d 234, 237-38, 274 N.E.2d 1, 3 (1971) which failed to adopt the "Oregon Rule."
120 N.J. Super. at 561, 562, 295 A.2d at 379.
51 120 N.J. Super. at 563, 295 A.2d at 380.
52 Id. at 561, 295 A.2d at 379.
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[D]efendant's "other insurance" clause would then serve only to
preclude dual recoveries by forcing the insured to first report to
the "primary" company and then to his own insurer for the excess,
which would not be "available" from the "primary" company. This
is consonant with N.J.S.A. 17:28-1.1, which provides for payments
"of all or part of the sums which persons insured . . . shall be
legally entitled to recover."58
The court, by rejecting the rationale in Morelock v. Millers'
Mutual Insurance Association5 4 which held the excess clause to be an
unambiguous indication of the contractual intent of the parties and a
valid policy within the legislative intent of the financial responsibility
laws, 55 indicated its own holding would be based on the alternative
method of analysis-public policy and compliance with the statute requiring uninsured motorist coverage.5"
Courts have been divided on the validity of "other insurance"
clauses as determined by the purpose of uninsured motorist legislation. 57 The philosophy holding these clauses valid (the conservative
approach), supports the proposition that the purpose of uninsured
motorist coverage is to
give the same protection to a person injured by an uninsured
motorist as he would have if he had been injured in an accident
caused by an automobile covered by a standard liability insurance
policy. 58
Furthermore, several authorities in the insurance field maintain that
the coverage should compensate the injured only to the extent that the
58 Id. (emphasis added).
The term "legally entitled" has been interpreted as import[ing] into the Endorsement all the normal rules governing tort liability and damages. Accordingly, in
order to collect under the Endorsement, the insured must be able to prove an automobile tort case against the uninsured motorist.
Stanton, supra note 9, at 29 (footnote omitted).
54 49 Ill. 2d 234, 274 N.E.2d 1 (1971).
55 Id. at 238, 274 N.E.2d at 3:

"Construing an insurance contract accurately and giving it the effect which its
language clearly commands, is not ipso facto a breach of public policy merely
because it disappoints the innocent victim of an uninsured motorist." [The] . . .
legislature's intent . . . is satisfied by coverage which assures . . . compensation
. . . to at least the same extent compensation "is available for injury by a
motorist who is insured in compliance with the Financial Responsibility Law."
Id. (quoting in part from Putnam v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 48 Ill. 2d 71, 86, 89,
269 N.E.2d 97, 104, 106 (1970)).
56 120 N.J. Super. at 561-62, 295 A.2d at 379.
57 See Soich, Uninsured Motorist Coverage; Past, Present, and Future, 6 DuQ. L. Rnv.
341, 342-56 (1968); Stanton, supra note 9, at 48-50.
58 12 G. COUCH, COUCH ON INSURANCF 2d, § 45:623 (1964) (footnote omitted).
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tortfeasor's liability insurance meets the limits required by the financial
responsibility laws. 59
The first circuit court decision expanding this theory was Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Wells"° which held that the financial responsibility law did not provide an injured passenger with uninsured protection
beyond the amounts set by the statute through "stacking" of policies,
that is, combining the driver's insurance with the passenger's own uninsured motorist policy. The court reasoned that "stacking" would
place the innocent victim of a negligent uninsured in a better position
than one involved with a negligent, minimally insured motorist.6 '
This reasoning was the most common approach used in upholding
insurance agreements containing an "other insurance" clause.62 It was
followed in Maryland Casualty Co. v. Howe: 63
The design and purpose of the uninsured motorist insurance
statute was to provide protection only up to the minimum statutory limits for bodily injuries caused by financially irresponsible
motorists. The statute was not designed to provide the insured
with greater insurance protection than would have been available
had the insured been injured by an operator with a policy containing minimum statutory limits. 6 4
Several other jurisdictions have adopted this reasoning. 65
The McFarland court, however, followed a different approach in
interpreting the uninsured motorist statutory purpose. It found that
59 Denny, Uninsured Motorist Coverage-Present and Future, 52 VA. L. REv. 538,
556-60 (1966).
60 316 F.2d 770 (4th Cir. 1963). This proposition was reconsidered in Virginia in
Bryant v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 205 Va. 897, 140 S.E.2d 817 (1965) which
adopted the "liberal" approach. See Soich, supra note 57, at 343.
61 316 F.2d at 773.
62 Soich; supra note 57, at 350.
63 106 N.H. 422, 213 A.2d 420 (1965).
64 Id. at 424, 213 A.2d at 422.
65 See, e.g., Harris v. Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., 274 Ark. 961, 448 S.W.2d
652 (1970); Morelock v. Millers' Mut. Ins. Ass'n, 49 Ill. 2d 234, 274 N.E.2d 1 (1971); Putnam
v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 48 Ill. 2d 71, 269 N.E.2d 97 (1970); Tindall v. Farmers
Auto. Management Corp., 83 Ill. App. 2d 165, 226 N.E.2d 397 (1967); Burcham v. Farmers
Ins. Exch., 255 Iowa 69, 121 N.W.2d 500 (1963); Webb v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
479 S.W.2d 148 (Mo. App. 1972) (While the "conservative" statutory interpretation was
used, a "liberal" result was reached by refusing to allow medical payment coverage to
reduce uninsured motorist coverage.); Globe Indem. Co. v. Baker's Estate, 22 App. Div.
2d 658, 253 N.Y.S.2d 170 (1964); Russell v. Paulson, 18 Utah 2d 157, 417 P.2d 658 (1966)
(This case involved a pro rata vs. limited excess clause situation which gave the limited
excess clause effect.); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Bafus, 77 Wash. 2d 720, 466 P.2d
159 (1970); Miller v. Allstate Ins. Co., 66 Wash. 2d 871, 405 P.2d 712 (1965) (The case
involved pro rata vs. escape clause conflict, which upheld the escape clause as what was
intended by the contracting parties.)
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N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:28-1.1 requires that financially responsible people
be provided for recovery of damages and since this statute was found
to allow recovery from all possible sources, the excess clause is a nullity. e6 The court relied on Safeco Insurance Co. of America v. Jones,6 7
an Alabama decision, as typifying the correct analysis. Presented with
an identical fact pattern Safeco reviewed the case law which established
the "new majority"6 8 and cited Sellers v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. 9 as the precursor of its decision. The Sellers court held that
"other insurance" clauses cannot limit amounts of coverage contrary
to
the statutory minimum: 70
The statute is designed to protect the insured as to his actual loss
within such limits, but being of statutory origin it is not intended
that an insured shall receive more from such coverage than his
actual loss, although he is the beneficiary under multiple policies
issued pursuant to [the statute] ....
71

Similarly, the Virginia supreme court in Bryant v. State Farm
66 120 N.J. Super. at 560, 295 A.2d at 379.
67 286 Ala. 606, 243 So. 2d 736 (1970). Similar reasoning has been used in later
Alabama cases, see Hogan v. Allstate Ins. Co., 287 Ala. 696, 255 So. 2d 35 (1971); State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Cahoon, 287 Ala. 462, 252 So. 2d 619 (1971); Preferred Risk
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Holmes, 287 Ala. 251, 251 So. 2d 213 (1971). (The latter two cases used
the "liberal" approach and held that workmen's compensation benefits received could not
be set off against uninsured motorist policies.)
6s 286 Ala. at 614, 243 So. 2d at 742. It has been calculated that the majority of
states now allow "stacking," finding the "other insurance" clause violative of the
public policy espoused in the financial responsibility laws. Comment, The Invalidity of
the "Other Insurance" Provision: A New Majority, 17 S.D.L. REv. 152, 165 (1972).
69 185 So. 2d 689 (Fla. 1966).
70 Id. at 692. The Sellers case was followed in: Transportation Ins. Co. v. Wade,
11 Ariz. App, 14, 461 P.2d 190 (1970) (Plaintiff's decedent was killed while a passenger
in his own vehicle due to negligence of an uninsured motorist. Recovery was granted
under both the driver's and owner's policies); Travelers Indem. Co. v. Williams, 119 Ga.
App. 414, 167 S.E.2d 174 (1969) (Guest passengers injured in an accident caused by the
negligence of an uninsured, recovered under the owner's policy as well as their own);
Stephens v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 182 Neb. 562, 156 N.W.2d 133 (1968) (Plaintiff was
negligently injured by another who was insured by defendant insurance company. Subsequently, the insurer became insolvent. Thus, using the public policy argument behind the
uninsured motorist statute, the court held that the insurer is not allowed to set off against
its own uninsured motorist policy, medical insurance payments on the owner's uninsured
motorist policy); Moore v. Hartford Ins. Co., 270 N.C. 532, 155 S.E.2d 128 (1967) (Plaintiff's
wife was killed while a passenger in an insured vehicle as a result of the negligence of
the uninsured motorist in the other vehicle. Husband was granted recovery under the
driver's policy as well as the owner's uninsured motorist policy); Harleysville Mut. Cas.
Co. v. Blumling, 429 Pa. 389, 241 A.2d 112 (1968). Plaintiff, while driving his employer's
vehicle was injured due to the negligence of the uninsured motorist in the other vehicle.
Recovery was allowed under the employer's policy as well as the uninsured motorist
coverage on plaintiff's own automobile).
71 Sellers v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 185 So. 2d 689, 692 (Fla. 1966).
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Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. 72 found that such limited excess

clauses violate the statutory mandate in that they fail to allow the
recovery of all sums to which the insured is legally entitled, and not
only those sums as exceed the other applicable limits. 73 Thus the court
decided that the insured should collect the unpaid portion of his judgment within the limit of his policy. This reasoning typifies the
"liberal" approach.
The McFarland court, in order to strike the excess-escape clause
as against public policy, needed a vehicle to implement its determination since no statutory authorization existed in N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 17:28-1.1 to permit the voiding of such invalid clauses.7 4 Analogizing
from cases in which the court invalidated restrictive clauses geared to
limit omnibus coverage, 75 the court concluded that the power to delete
such inconsistent clauses was grounded in N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:6-48
(b) 78 which provides that a policy that has a more restrictive omnibus

coverage is automatically amended to conform to the statutory standard.
The court was then compelled to establish the purpose of the
statute to determine whether the "other insurance" clause was contrary
to the legislative intent.7 7 Relying on the analysis of Selected Risks
Insurance Co. v. Zullo, 78 the court found the general purpose of the

72 205 Va. 897, 140 S.E.2d 817 (1965).
78 Id. at 901, 140 S.E.2d at 820.
74 120 N.J. Super. at 559, 295 A.2d at 378.
75 The prototype of such an omnibus clause is provided by N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:646(a) (Supp. 1972-73). The policy shall:
[I]nsure the insured named therein and any other person using or responsible
for the use of any such motor vehicle with the express or implied consent of
the insured ....
Cases promoting the insured's rights to recovery under the omnibus clause include:
Selected Risks Ins. Co. v. Zullo, 48 N.J. 362, 225 A.2d 570 (1966) ("scope of permission"
limitation was nullified); Newark Ins. Co. v. Concord Ins. Co., 115 N.J. Super. 147, 278
A.2d 508 (App. Div. 1971) ('duly licensed" requirement was deleted); Kish v. Motor Club
of America Ins. Co., 108 N.J. Super. 405, 261 A.2d 662 (App. Div. 1970), cert. denied, 55
N.J. 595, 264 A.2d 68 (1970) (striking an exclusionary clause relating to the insured, his
spouse or minor children); Willis v. Security Ins. Group, 104 N.J. Super. 410, 250 A.2d
158 (Ch. 1968), aff'd, 53 N.J. 260, 250 A.2d 129 (1969) (invalidating an exclusion against
individuals driving the insured's automobile with his permission when such individuals
had valid and collectible insurance in $10,000/$20,000 minimums under their own policies).
76 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:6-48(b) (1961) providing in part:
[A~ny policy of motor vehicle liability insurance furnished as proof of financial
responsibility . . . shall be deemed amended to conform with and to contain all
the provisions required by this act, any provision of the policy or certificate to
the contrary notwithstanding.
77 120 N.J. Super. at 559, 295 A.2d at 378.
78 48 N.J. 362, 371, 225 A.2d 570, 575 (1966).
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Motor Vehicle Security Responsibility Law,79 the Unsatisfied Claim
and Judgment Fund Law,80 and the Motor Vehicle Liability Security
Fund Act8l was to provide victims of auto accidents financially responsible parties from whom claims could be satisfied.
Turning then to N.J.

STAT. ANN.

§ 17:28-1.1, to which the afore-

mentioned legislative purpose is imputed, the court found that the Act
did not limit the insured's right to claim additional damages to the
amount by which the "other insurance" policy limit exceeds the primary policy coverage. 2 Thus, since the legislature did not include a
ceiling in the statute, neither could the insurer create one through a
self-imposed limiting provision. 8 To adopt the contrary would be to
render the endorsement nugatory, since in reality no excess generally
84
exists in a multiple coverage situation.
The McFarlanddecision seems to reiterate the philosophy of Professor Widiss, who maintained:
Such provisions are justifiable where indemnification has been
complete, but their propriety seems highly suspect when invoked
by an insurance company to avoid liability when the claimant has
not been fully compensated.8 5
Additionally, the author noted that "judicial hostility" against exclusions or limitations in the endorsements has been increasing in order
to further the policy of indemnifying victims of negligent, financially
irresponsible motorists and to stem the tendency of the insurer to deny
liability by imposing narrower limits than the state statutes require.8 6
This "hostility" theory may shed light on the McFarlandrationale
by which the court opted to follow the "liberal" approach, although
N.J.

STAT. ANN. §

17:28-1.1 tends to support the "conservative" inter-

pretation. The New Jersey uninsured motorist statute does not expressly characterize its limit as either a minimum or maximum.8 7 The
statute describes the limit by a reference to N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:6-69,'

which sets out the application procedure for payment from the Un79 N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 39:6-23 to -60 (1961).
80 N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 39:6-61 to -91 (1961).
81 N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 39:6-92 to -104 (1961).

82 120 N.J. Super. at 560, 295 A.2d at 379.
88 Id.
84 Id.
85 A. Wmiss, A GUIDE TO UNINSURED MoToisr COvERAGE
86 Id. at § 8.6, 288-89.

§ 8.1, at 283 (1969).

N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:28-1.1 (1970) states in part:
[C]overage is offered in connection therewith, in limits . . . set forth in section
9 of chapter 174 of the laws of 1952 (C. 39:6-69) . ...
87
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satisfied Claim and Judgment Fund.8 8 The limits established in this
statute are the maximum amounts one can recover from the fund
89
regardless of whether a victim is fully compensated or not.
In contradistinction, the leading "liberal" approach cases, in Virginia, the Bryant decision and in Florida, the Sellers case both involved
uninsured motorist statutes with specific language setting minimum
limits.9 Thus the fact that words such as "limits not less than X
amount" are notably missing from the New Jersey statute made the
court's task more difficult. The McFarland court summarily adopted
the reasoning used in Safeco, which, the court stated, involved a similarly constructed statute. 91 However, upon closer scrutiny the Alabama
statute does not in fact parallel the New Jersey provision, but like the
Florida and Virginia laws, includes language setting only minimum
limits of recovery.9 2 Thus, the strength of Safeco as a precedent for
McFarland is somewhat diminished. Instead, the New Jersey decision
essentially adopted the philosophy of the "liberal" courts, as outlined in
Safeco, espousing the public policy argument of just compensation, and
predicating this philosophy on the premise that
since the statutes did not specifically authorize the limitations or
exclusions included in the coverage terms by the company, the
insurer ought not to be allowed to avoid liability for injuries
88 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:6-69 (1961) provides in part:

[D]irecting payment out of the fund, of the amount unpaid upon such judgment
for bodily injury or death, which does not exceed, or upon such judgment
for damage to property which exceeds the sum of $100.00 and does not exceed(a) The maximum amount or limit of $10,000.00 . . . on account of injury
to, or death of, 1 person, in any 1 accident, and
(b) The maximum amount or limit, subject to such limit for any 1 person
so injured or killed, of $20,000.00 . . . in any 1 accident, and
(c) The maximum amount or limit of $5,000.00 . .. for damage to property
in any 1 accident.
89 Dixon v. Gassert, 26 N.J. 1, 8, 138 A.2d 14, 18 (1958):
[The Unsatisfied Claim & Judgment Fund Law] does not reflect an intention
to make every claimant completely whole, but rather to provide some measure
of relief up to a maximum ....
See also Bacon v. Miller, 113 N.J. Super. 271, 275, 273 A.2d 602, 606 (App. Div. 1971).
90 VA. CODE ANN. § 38.1-381(b) (1970) provides in part: "[W]ithin limits which shall
be no less than the requirements of § 46.1-1(8), as amended from time to time.
(emphasis added).
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.727(1) (1972) (this has incorporated the former statute, FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 627.0851 (Supp. 1970)) provides: "[I]n not less than the limits described in
§ 324.021(7) .... "
91 120 N.J. Super. at 561-63, 295 A.2d at 379-80.
92 ALA. CODE TIT. 36 § 74(46)(c) (Supp. 1969) provides in part: "[Coverage is provided]
to a limit, exclusive of interest and costs, of not less than [statutory amounts] ....
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falling within the general scope defined by the uninsured motorist
statute. 98
Further complicating the logic of McFarland is the fact that N.J.
§ 17:28-1.1 has been interpreted as having the legislative
purpose of relieving the Unsatisfied Claim and Judgment Fund of
financial burdens from claims relating to uninsured motorists. 94 However this interpretation is valid only where the primary insurer issues
uninsured motorist coverage for an amount less than $10,000 and the
passenger's own policy is for an identical amount. If the latter policy is
restricted through its "other insurance" clause to allow recovery only
to the difference between its policy and any other available insurance,
the insured could then proceed to collect against the Fund. Thus, the
Fund would be responsible for the difference between the primary
insurer's policy and the $10,000 maximum set by the statute.9 5 Consequently, "stacking" would then effectively relieve the Fund. However, since N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:28-1.1 requires uninsured motorist
protection to be provided in the same monetary limits as does the
Fund, 96 such a situation could never arise. Thus the Fund is relieved in
the McFarlandsituation whether the excess provision be invalidated or
97
not.
Rejecting this view of the statute, the McFarlandcourt relied on
general rules of interpreting insurance contracts; 98 that ambiguities
are resolved in the insured's favor99 and exclusionary clauses are
strictly interpreted against the insurer.1 00 Although the result is appealing and it is logically just for an insured to receive his paid-for
protection, the construction of the New Jersey statute does not lend
STAT. ANN.

93 A. WmDIss, supra note 85, § 8.6, at 289 as quoted in Safeco Ins. Co. of America
v. Jones, 286 Ala. 606, 613, 243 So. 2d 736, 741 (1970).
94 See Hannan v. Employers Commercial Union Ins. Co., 117 N.J. Super. 485, 489,
285 A.2d 83, 85 (L. Div. 1971); Exum v. Marrow, 112 N.J. Super. 570, 574, 272 A.2d
298, 300 (L. Div. 1970).
95 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:6-69 (1961).
96 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:28-1.1 (1970).

97 The McFarland court recognizes this inconsistency: "This purpose is, of course,
accomplished even by limiting an insured to proceeding against one insurer, as defendant
urges." 120 N.J. Super. at 559, 295 A.2d at 378.
98 Id. at 560-61, 295 A.2d at 379.
99 Bryan Constr. Co. v. Employers' Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 60 N.J. 375, 377, 290
A.2d 138, 140 (1972).
100 Chicago Ins. Co. v. Security Ins. Co., 111 N.J. Super. 291, 295, 268 A.2d 296,
298 (App. Div. 1970).
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itself to the "liberal" interpretation except by the general theory of
uninsured motorist protection andopublic policy. 011
The justice of allowing "stacking" is self-evident where an innocent victim of a negligent uninsured must bear the financial burdens
of not being fully compensated because his paid-for protection has been
negated by the insurer's built-in "hands-off" clause. The McFarland
court recognized the need for full compensation in such circumstances
to ease the financial burdens threatening the motoring public when
involved with an uninsured. However, the "stacking" principle will
inevitably shift a greater burden to the insurance companies with the
usual effect of spreading the costs to the public in the form of higher
premium rates.
Further discounting the force of the McFarland decision is the
fact that as of January 1, 1973, New Jersey enacted a no-fault plan, The
New Jersey Automobile Reparation Reform Act.10 2 This act establishes
compulsory liability insurance'0 3 as well as compulsory uninsured
motorist protection. 1°4 In essence, the number of uninsured drivers
should be drastically reduced when no-fault becomes fully operational.
Among those who may still fall into the class of the financially irresponsible are operators of commercial vehicles, hit-and-run vehicles,
out-of-state vehicles, and, of course, those who fail to comply with the
no-fault legislation. In these cases, the uninsured motorist policy
remains a viable instrument. Additionally, since a passenger would
look first to his own policy to recover for personal injury, despite the
cause of the accident, the need and opportunity to "stack" policies for
recovery of such special damages is reduced. However, the McFarland
fact pattern may arise in that even under no-fault, a tort claim may be
made if injuries sustained are above $200, exclusive of hospital costs. 10 5
Thus, once a passenger recovers his medical expenses under his own
policy, retaining a right to a tort claim, and thus a sum to which he is
legally entitled to recover, 1 6 he could make a claim under the auto101 A suggested resolution to the problem of interpreting uninsured motorist statutes
is to introduce new state legislation that incorporates "other insurance" clauses. Such
statutes would provide the limits, if any, of coverage and the method by which the loss
will be allocated.
See Comment, Limitations of Liability Within Uninsured Motorist Insurance Policies and Their Validity Under Mandatory Statutes, 52 NEB. L. REV. 158, 176-78 (1972).
See, e.g., CAL. INS. CODE § 11580.2(c)(2) (West 1972).
102 Law of January 1, 1973, ch. 70, [1973] N.J. Laws 180.
108 Id. § 3.

104 Id. § 14.
105 Id. § 8.
106 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:28-1.1 (1970).
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mobile's uninsured motorist endorsement, reverting lastly to his own
uninsured coverage if not yet fully compensated. McFarland's impact
as a victory for the public may be tempered through the effects of nofault as well as the potential diffusion of the costs to the insureds
through higher premium payments.
Maria Marinari

